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SALES - ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY -
PRIVITY NOT REQUIRED
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,
217 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
Winterbottom v. Wright,1 an 1842 English landmark decision
in products liability law, held that absent a contractual relationship
between the parties there could be no action by an injured passenger
against the seller of a coach who had contracted to keep the coach
in repair. "Thus, the notorious creature, 'privity of contract,' was
born."2  And ever since its birth, the courts have been slowly but
steadily burying it.
The privity barrier first fell away in actions which alleged negli-
gence in the manufacture of an article which caused injury to the
consumer. Here, the leading case was MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,' which in effect abolished the rule requiring privity of contract
in negligence actions.4 In MacPherson, the court held a manu-
facturer liable for injuries to a remote vendee caused by a product
which, because negligently made, had become dangerous.
The demise of the privity requirement in actions based on war-
ranty has not progressed as rapidly as in negligence actions, and it
is in this area that the doctrine of strict liability has begun to blossom.
As with negligence cases, the first products covered by the strict
liability doctrine were food and drink; then products intended for
intimate bodily use were encompassed.5 A brief breakthrough in the
privity requirement was made in 1951 in DiVello v. Gardner Mach.
Co.,6 where the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County became
I 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2 Note, 17 W. RES. L REV. 300 (1965).
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). Although MacPherson is the leading case,
it was not the first. In 1852 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 held that a dealer in
drugs who negligently labeled a deadly poison as a harmless medicine was liable to a
person not in privity with the dealer who, without fault on his part, was injured by the
use of the product. Following this case, the courts began to abandon the requirement of
privity in cases involving products for human consumption and then in products which
were inherently dangerous to the consuming public. For a history of the demise of
privity in negligence actions, see PROSSER, TORTS § 96, at 659-63 (3d ed. 1964); Note,
19 RUTGERS L. REv. 715 (1965); Note, supra note 2.
4 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 96, at 661.
5 Id. § 97, at 676.
6 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P. 1951). DiVeflo was later impliedly overruled by
Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
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the first to permit recovery without a showing of negligence in a
case involving something other than products for intimate bodily
use.7  In DiVello, the court allowed recovery against the manufac-
turer of a defective grinding wheel which had burst, injuring an
employee;8 however, the case was later overruled? Then in 1958
the Michigan Supreme Court, in a case where defective building
blocks caused a house to collapse, held that the manufacturer was
liable to the ultimate purchaser of the house even though no negli-
gence or privity of contract was shown." A majority of the courts
which have since considered the question have followed the lead
of the ichigan court."
In Ohio, the law of products liability has had a slow but orderly
development. 2  Until 1958, the courts denied recovery in warranty
actions in the absence of privity.'" In Rogers v. Toni Home Perma-
nent Co.,'4 however, the supreme court held that where a consumer
relies on the advertising of a product and that product causes injury
to the consumer, privity is not required in an action against the
manufacturer on an express warranty. In 1960, the court, in Ken-
nedy v. General Beauty Prods., Inc. 5 held that for a damage action
based on breach of an implied warranty to lie, there must be privity
of contract.' 6
In 1962, the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in Ohio.'
7 PROSSE1R, op. cit. supra note 3, § 97, at 677.
8 102 N.E.2d at 289.
9 Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953), wherein
recovery was not allowed when the defect caused a fire. The court pointed out that for
an action in implied warranty to lie, there must be privity of contract between the plain-
tiff and the defendant.
30 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120,90 N.W.-
2d 873 (1958).
"1 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182
(1965); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Wights v.
Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965). Contra, e.g., Ciociola v.
Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 Del. 477, 172 A.2d 252 (1961); Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963); Kasey v. Suburban Gas Heat,
Inc., 60 Wash. 2d 468, 374 P.2d 549 (1962).12 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
laWelsh v. Ledyard, 167 Ohio St. 57, 146 N.E.2d 299 (1957); Wood v. General
Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8 (1953).
14 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
15 112 Ohio App. 505, 167 N.E.2d 116 (1960).
161d. at 508, 167 N.F.2d at 119. Accord, Miller v. Chrysler Corp., 183 N.E.2d
421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962).
1 7 Oo REv. CODE 5§ 1301.01-1309.50.
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Section 1302.31 of the Ohio Revised Code extends the seller's war-
ranties - express and implied - to members of the buyer's house-
hold and to his guests. The supreme court, in Inglis v. American
Motors Corp., recognized an action in tort based on breach of ex-
press warranty and permitted recovery for property damage caused
by a defective product. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently taken
another forward step by eliminating the requirement of privity in
actions alleging a breach of an implied warranty."
In Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,2" the defendant manufac-
tured and sold steel roof joists. The plaintiff was doing structural
iron work under an area where the joists had been installed when
the joists collapsed and fell on the plaintiff, causing him to suffer
injuries. In his petition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had impliedly warranted the roof joists to be of good and mer-
chantable quality and that because of the breach of said warranty,
the joists came apart and injured him. The defendant demurred
to the petition and, for purposes of the demurrer, the allegations
were taken to be true. The issue raised by these facts and considered
by the court was:
Where ... a manufacturer produced and sold steel joists, implicitly
representing that they were of good and merchantable quality,
fit and safe for the ordinary purposes ... but without advertising
the product, is [a] . . . user, whose presence the defendant could
... anticipate and who is injured because a defect in the joists
caused them to fall upon him, restricted to an action based on
negligence alone, or can he recover in an action in tort based upon
breach of this implied warranty where he was not in ... (privity)
with the manufacturer-defendant? 21
The court held that, in a products liability case, the plaintiff is not
restricted to an action based on negligence; he may proceed upon
the theory of implied warranty, notwithstanding the fact that there
is no contractual relationship between himself and the defendant
and even though the defendant does not advertise the product on
the market.
22
18 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
39 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
20 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966).
21 Id. at 236, 218 N.E.2d at 192. (Emphasis added.)
22 Id. at 227, 218 N.E.2d at 185. This was a four-to-three decision. The arguments
of the dissent, which were not heeded by the majority of the court, were: (1) The plain-
tiff failed to allege that the joists were defective - an element required by earlier Ohio
decisions. (2) Allegations that the joists were defective when sold and that the defec-
tive condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury would have been suf-
ficient, with help of res ipsa loquitur, to state a cause of action in negligence. There-
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Thus, Lonzrick has changed the law in Ohio. For the first time
the supreme court discarded the requirement of privity in a case
where there is no food, inherently dangerous articles, or advertising
involved and allowed recovery to a mere passive user of the product.
The court found certain representations implicit in the mere presence
of a product on the market." If these representations are breached
and an injury occurs, the injured party will have a cause of action
even though he is a stranger to any transaction involving the prod-
Uct.
2 4
The Lonzrick decision raises several interesting points for dis-
cussion. First, in the earlier cases which allowed recovery on ex-
press warranty - aside from those involving food or products for
intimate bodily use25 - the courts considered reliance by the plain-
tiff on the representations made in the defendant's advertising to be
a necessary element In Lonzrick, the defendant manufacturer made
no representations through advertising either to the plaintiff or to
the public in general. Therefore, although the plaintiff relied on
no express representations, he was still permitted to recover because
he was a "user"2" of a product which the manufacturer had im-
pliedly warranted. The court reached this conclusion even though
it was a passive use, his mere presence in the building making him
a "user" of the joists. No Ohio court and few courts of other juris-
dictions have gone this far in finding a user of a product.
Although few courts27 have allowed recovery to an innocent
bystander on the basis of strict tort liability,2" there seems to be no
valid reason to allow recovery to a passive user and yet deny it to
a pedestrian injured by a defective automobile' or to a bystander
injured by an exploding beer bottle.3" In neither case has the plain-
fore, strict liability is unnecessary. (3) The plaintiff did not rely on any representations
of the defendant, nor did the defendant make any representations to the plaintiff. (4)
The legislature and not the courts should decide whether privity should be abolished.
Id. at 240-52, 218 N.X.2d at 194-201.
23 Id. at 240, 218 N.E.2d at 194 (dissenting opinion).
24 Id. at 227, 218 N.B.2d at 185.
25 E.g., Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.B.2d 583
(1965); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612
(1958).
26 6 Ohio St. 2d at 236, 218 N.E.2d at 192.
27 Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Sulp. 142, 214 A.2d 694 (Super. Ct. 1965); Pierce-
field v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
2 8 See Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36 CLEv. B.A.J.
149, 174 (1965); Leading Comment, 27 Mo. L. Rsv. 194, 213 (1962).
2 9 Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
3 0 Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); accord, Hoch-
gertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
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tiff relied on any express representations of the defendant. Just as
the plaintiff in Lonzrick used the roof joists - to prevent the roof
from falling on him - so the pedestrian on the street uses the
brakes on a car - to prevent the car from running into him. The
same implicit representations were made to both, and there seems
to be no reason, now that the requirement of privity in an action
on implied warranty has been laid to rest, for denying recovery to
an innocent bystander."1 As a matter of public policy, such a person
has as much right to expect a non-defective automobile on the
streets, or a non-defective bottle in the supermarket, as did a per-
son injured by a steel roof joist to have expected it to have been
non-defective.33 The next step the Ohio Supreme Court may well
take, as a logical extension of the Lonzrick holding, is to allow an
innocent bystander recovery in strict tort liability.
A second point for discussion is the apparently intentional avoid-
ance by the Lonzrick court of the phrase "strict liability in tort."
This phrase was conspicuous by its absence because the court of
appeals 4 used the term almost exclusively. It explained:
The use of the word "warranty" is probably improper; however,
the courts, in describing causes of action for strict liability ...
seem to have continued to use it for want of a better word, not
intending to mean anything more than the manufacturer putting
his goods into the stream of commerce, thereby representing that
they are of merchantable quality... p5
The Restatement of Torts6 says nothing about warranty. In-
stead, it justifies recovery on the basis of strict liability in tort in
accord with Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., a leading Cali-
fornia case. But the comments explain that this should not prevent
the courts from calling strict liability in tort a breach of warranty
if they choose to do so.38 However, in order to avoid confusion, it
81 Dean Prosser feels that there is no essential reason why an innocent bystander
should not be allowed to recover in strict liability. However, he believes the courts will
draw the line at allowing recovery to the user or consumer. The sentiment has been
for the consumer and not the innocent bystander. Prosser, supra note 28.
-
3 2 Recovery has been allowed to a passenger in an automobile or in an airplane. See,
e.g., Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
3 Leading Comment, supra note 28.
34 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1965).
35 Id. at 384, 205 N.E.2d at 99.
36 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 402A (1965).
37 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) is one of the forerunners of the cases abolishing privity in actions for breach
of an implied warranty.
3 8 Prosser, supra note 28, at 168.
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would seem wise to discard the term "warranty" and instead to use
the term "strict liability in tort." Although breach of warranty was
originally a tort action,"a it now has a connotation of contract which
is misleading, since there is no contract between the plaintiff and
the manufacturer. Furthermore, the liability imposed on the manu-
facturer for the harm resulting from the defective goods may rest
on principles of tort law.4" That is, by selling a defective product,
the seller has breached a duty and for this breach he is held liable
in tort. The Ohio Supreme Court should follow the court of ap-
peals by designating such an action as one based on strict tort
liability rather than on the breach of an implied warranty.
The Lonzrick court stated that the confusion which arises from
the use of the word "warranty" is attributable to a failure to distin-
guish between the "two different kinds of warranties," '41 one based
on the contractual relation and the other upon the representations
implicit in putting the product on the market. These representa-
tions are made not only to persons who are in privity but also to
those who use or consume the product42 The former type is the
warranty covered by the Uniform Commercial Code, and the latter
is covered by tort principles. Aside from the misnomer involved
in the latter type of warranty,43 problems also arise when it is con-
strued in the light of the Code. Allowing recovery to one not in
privity with the manufacturer is not entirely inconsistent with the
Code. The comments to section 2-318" provide that the Code is
neutral as to allowing recovery to others, except for the purchaser
and his family, who are in the distributive chain. Moreover, as to
a person in a position similar to that of the plaintiff in Lonzrick,
the Code still would not permit recovery because he was never a
purchaser of the defective product.45 However, even if the Code
30 Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919, 920 (D.C. App.
1962); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, § 95, at 651.
40 Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Ore. 301, 310, 405 P.2d 624, 629 (1965);
Note, supra note 3, at 717.
41 6 Ohio St. 2d at 234, 218 N.E.2d at 190.
42 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963); Prosser, supra note 28, at 168.
43 The type of warranty will hereinafter be referred to as strict liability in tort.
4 4 UNIpORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 comment 3 [hereinafter cited as UCC].
45 Contra, Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communi-
cation Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5, 24-27 (1965). Professor Shanker suggests that
interpreting comment 3 as that limiting the development of case law to only those who
have purchased goods somewhere in the distributive chain "is far too strict and deprives
the comment of its intended meaning." Id. at 26.
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were held to apply to persons not in the chain of distribution, the
courts have already held that various provisions are not applicable
in actions based on strict liability in tort.46
For example, the Code permits the seller of a product to modify
or exclude both express and implied warranties47 and also to modify
or limit the remedies available to the damaged party.4" Under the
theory of strict liability in tort, an attempted disclaimer by the seller
has been held to be ineffective.4" The cause of action is not based
on the validity of a contract or any representation contained therein.
Instead, it is based on the breach of a duty owed to the consumer
or user - it is a tort action, and therefore any restrictions on con-
tractual liability are immaterial."0
Another Code provision which is inapplicable in strict liability
cases is the one dealing with notice to the seller.51 Section 2-607(3)
provides that the buyer must give the seller notice within a reason-
able time after he discovers or should have discovered a breach.
Several courts, in cases based on strict tort, have asserted that the
notice requirement is not applicable." At least one writer has de-
dared that any distinction between the notice requirements under
the Code and the lack of them under strict liability is merely illu-
sory. 3 He relies on comment 5 to section 2-607 which states that
a remote party is not held to the notice requirements of 2-607 but
is only "held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has had
46 See Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the
Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RuTGERS L REV. 692
(1965).
4 7 UCC § 2-316.
48UCC § 2-719. However, it must be pointed out that in the case of consumer
goods, limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person is prima facie uncon-
scionable. UCC § 2-719(3).
49 Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965); Vander-
mark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
900 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Browne v. Fenestra, Inc., 375 Mich. 566, 571,
134 N.W.2d 730, 732 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A,
comment n (1965); Note, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 683, 685 (1966); Shanker, snpra note
45, at 7.
50 Note, supra note 49, at 685.
51 UCC § 2-607(3).
5 2 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 263, 391 P.2d 168, 172, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 900 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377
P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co.,
375 Mich. 85, 100, 133 N.W.2d 129, 136 (1965). See also Shanker, supra note 45,
at 27; Note, supra note 49, at 685.
53 Shanker, supra note 45, at 27.
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time to become aware of the legal situation."54  However, it would
seem that under strict tort liability the injured party is not even re-
quired to notify the seller within a reasonable time. As has been
said, an action in strict tort does not sound in contract but in tort
for the breach of a duty owed. It is the statute of limitations for
actions on bodily injury or injury to personal property which should
control the giving of notice rather than the "reasonable" or "good
faith" time allowed by the Code. This argument can be supported
by comparing a strict liability action to one sounding in negligence.
The only difference between the two is that in a strict liability action
negligence does not have to be proven.5 In a negligence action,
the question of notice is governed by the statute of limitations on
the bringing of such an action. Since the two actions are so similar,
there appears to be no reason why the same statute should not
control the giving of notice in strict tort liability cases.
The third area in which a difference exists between the Code
and strict liability is related to the preceding discussion of notice,
namely, the statute of limitations on the bringing of an action. Un-
der the Code, the statute of limitations as applied in an action for
breach of warranty is four years after the action accrues, and the
action accrues when tender or delivery is made.5" Under strict lia-
bility in tort, however, the cause of action accrues when the injury
occurs;57 thus the statute of limitations should be the same as that
which applies to personal property and bodily injuries. In Ohio
this is a two-year statute.5" Therefore, if the Code were held to be
applicable and a party were injured by a defective product four years
and a day after the sale, this party would be barred from recovery,
even though he may never have had an opportunity to inspect the
product, unless he were able to carry the burden of proving negli-
gence. Many times a defect in a long-lived product will not arise
until several years after its initial sale. It would be unfair to place
an injured party who was unable to inspect on the same footing
with someone who could have inspected and discovered the defect.
This is another reason why the statute of limitations for negligence
should also apply to strict liability in tort actions.
The critics of strict liability in tort argue not only that it is
contrary to the Code but also that it imposes an absolute liability
5 4 UCC § 2-607, comment 5.
5 5Note, 19 RuTGERS L. REV. 715 (1965).
56UCC §§ 2-725 (1), (2).
57 Cf. PROSSER, TORTs § 30, at 147 (3d ed. 1964).
58 OHIo REV. CODE § 2305.10.
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on the defendant manufacturer.59 In answer to this argument, the
Lonzrick court explained that the plaintiff still must carry the bur-
den of proof.6" The plaintiff must prove that the joists were defec-
tive at the time the manufacturer sold them, that the defect caused the
joists to collapse while they were being used for their ordinary pur-
pose, that the defect was the direct and proximate cause of the
injury, and that the manufacturer could reasonably anticipate the
plaintiff's presence in the building at the time of the accident.6
In addition, the court stated that the "defendant has available the
opportunity to offer evidence in defense on each of these necessary
elements of the plaintiff's case, and also ... the defense of assump-
tion of risk and intervening cause."6  The defense of contributory
negligence was not raised.6" This is in accord with the Restatement
of Torts,64 which does not recognize contributory negligence as a
defense when it consists of failing to discover a defect or to guard
against the possibility of its existence but does recognize assumption
of the risk as a defense.65 A variation of the defense of contributory
negligence has been recognized in at least one case,66 in which the
court called it "misuse," that is, a "use different from or more stren-
uous than that contemplated to be safe by ordinary users/con-
sumers."67  In addition to the defenses of assumption of the risk
and intervening cause, the Ohio courts might recognize "misuse" if
faced with the proper factual situation." But it does appear that
they will not accept the defense of contributory negligence in an
action based on strict liability in tort.
If the defect is laid at the manufacturer's doorstep and if he is
unable to raise any of the above defenses, he, in effect, becomes
an insurer without limit of any damage proximately caused by a
defect existing in his product at the time of its sale, even though
no amount of care could have eliminated that defect, even though
59Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 240, 252, 218 N.E-2d
185, 194, 201 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
60 Id. at 237, 218 N.E.2d at 192-93.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 This is contrary to DiVello v. Gardner Mach. Co., 102 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio C.P.
1951), which recognized contributory negligence as a defense. However, DiVello was
impliedly overruled by Wood v. General Elec. Co., 159 Ohio St. 273, 112 N.E.2d 8
(1953).
64 REsATEMENT (SiacoND), TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965).
65 Ibid.
66 Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
67 Id. at 429.
68 See Note, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 300, 317 (1965).
[Vol. 18: 664
IMPLIED WARRANTY
such manufacturer made no representations about his product to
anyone, and even though no one knew that it was his product.69
Various reasons have been given for placing the manufacturer
in such an unfavored position, one reason being that public interest
demands that the cost of injuries or damage resulting from defective
products be borne by the makers who put them into the channels
of commerce rather than by the injured consumer or user who is
powerless to protect himself.7" A second reason is that "the maker,
by placing the goods upon the market, represents to the public that
they are suitable and safe for use... and when it leads to disaster,
he should not be permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying
that he has made no contract with the consumer."71 Another reason
is that strict tort liability would otherwise be enforced by a series of
suits. The retailer is first held liable to the consumer or user. He
then sues the middleman who in turn seeks recovery from the manu-
facturer. Rather than require this multiplicity of suits, it is much
less burdensome for all concerned to permit the injured party to
seek relief directly from the manufacturer.72 One other reason for
allowing direct recovery by the consumer in strict liability is that,
although the cost of an injury may be an overwhelming one for the
injured party, the manufacturer can insure himself against the risk
by distributing among the public the cost of such insurance." The
manufacturer even has his choice of methods of insuring; he can
either raise the cost of his product or buy.insurance coverage at a
relatively nominal cost.74 Despite these arguments for strict tort
liability, however, there are those who oppose it.75
One argument against the imposition of strict tort liability is
that by imposing such high standards on marketed products, the
09 Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 240, 218 N.E.2d 185,
194-95 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
70 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64-65,
207 A.2d 305, 311-12 (1965); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strcit Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-23 (1960).
71 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 57, § 97, at 674. Leading Comment, supra note 28,
at 206.
72 PRossm, op. cit. supra note 57, § 97, at 674.
73 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
74 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 73, at 462, 150 P.2d at 441; Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960); Lead-
ing Comment, supra note 28, at 207.
75 E.g., Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in
Products - An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957).
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development of new products will be hindered.7" The proponents
of this view claim that it is impossible to test a new product fully
in the laboratory, the only true test being use by the consuming
public. Accordingly, if a manufacturer can be held liable even
though he has done everything possible to test the safety of the
product, he will be quite hesitant to place it on the market.
Dean Prosser suggests that the manufacturer of a new product
should be required to give notice of the potential dangers of the
product but should not be held to strict liability." There are sev-
eral problems inherent in this suggestion. First, it is difficult to
define what a new product is and for how long it will remain new.
Furthermore, one cogent argument in favor of strict liability is the
belief that the manufacturer owes a duty to the consuming public."8
The question therefore arises as to whether this duty should be sub-
ordinated to the public's need for new and better products - a
question with which the courts will be faced in coming years.
The critics of strict liability also argue against the so-called "risk
spreading" explanation." It is contended that many manufacturers
will not be able to raise their prices and still remain competitive."0
This argument has been countered by the suggestion that the manu-
facturer purchase insurance at a minimal cost which even the small-
est manufacturer can afford.8' But even if a manufacturer could
not raise his prices or buy insurance, his duty to the public to place
safe products on the market and to be held liable for any that are
defective is unaltered. When a product is placed in the flow of
commerce, the user or consumer usually does not examine the finan-
cial stability of the manufacturer. Instead, he relies on the repre-
sentations implicit in the product having been placed on the mar-
ket. 2 If the manufacturer cannot afford to meet this duty, he
should nevertheless be held strictly liable and thereby possibly be
forced out of business. This threat, however, should induce manu-
facturers to exercise great care in placing safe products on the
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